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ABSTRACT 
This paper attempt has been made to explain a fuzzy 
commitment scheme. In the conventional Commitment 
schemes, both committed string m and valid opening key 
are required to enable the sender to prove the 
commitment. However there could be many instances 
where the transmission involves noise or minor errors 
arising purely because of the factors over which neither 
the sender nor the receiver have any control. 
The fuzzy commitment scheme presented in this paper is 
to accept the opening key that is close to the original 
one in suitable distance metric, but not necessarily 
identical. The concept itself is illustrated with the help 
of simple situation. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The notion of Commitment scheme is at the 
heart of most the constructions of modern 
Cryptography protocols. Protocols are 
essentially a set of rules associated with a 
process or a scheme defining the process.  
Commitment schemes are the processes in 
which the interests of the parties involved in 
a process are safeguarded and the process 
itself is made as fair as possible. 
Commitment protocols were first introduced 
by Blum [1] in 1982; many more 
Commitment Schemes were later developed 
with improved features [5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13]. 
Moreover in the conventional Commitment 
schemes, opening key are required to enable 
the sender to prove the commitment. 
However there could be many instances 
where the transmission involves noise or 
minor errors arising purely because of the 
factors over which neither the sender nor the 
receiver have any control. 
Our aim in this paper to describe 
commitment schemes, which use algorithms 
to counter possible uncertainness. 
Uncertainty leads to introduction of fuzzy 
sets and fuzzy logic[2]  in to the protocol 
itself. 
Fuzzy commitment scheme was first 
introduced by Juels and Martin [3], fuzziness 
also introduced later in [4,14,15] for 
generating cryptographic keys.  They add 
new property called "fuzziness" in the open 
phase to allow, acceptance of the 
commitment using corrupted opening key 
that is close to the original one in appropriate 
metric or distance. In this paper we have 
attempted a more formal and mathematical 
definition of fuzzy commitment schemes. An 
overview of commitment schemes and 
description of related work is also 
incorporated. A brief introduction of error 
correcting codes, with real life situation to 
illustrate is attempted. 
 
2.  Crisp Commitment Schemes 
In a conventional commitment scheme, one 
party, whom we denote the sender namely 
Alice, aim to entrust a concealed message m 
to the second party namely Bob. Intuitively a 
commitment scheme can be seen as the 
digital equivalent of a sealed envelope. If 
Alice wants to commit to some message m 
she just puts it into the sealed envelope, so 
that whenever Alice wants to reveal the 
message to Bob, she opens the envelope. 
Clearly, such a mechanism can be useful 
only if it meets some basic requirements. 
First of all the digital envelope should hide 
the message from: Bob should be able to 
learn m from the commitment (this is often 
referred in the literature as the hiding 
property). Second, the digital envelope 
should be binding, meaning with this that 
Alice can not change her mind about m, and 
by checking the opening of the commitment 
one can verify that the obtained value is 
actually the one Alice had in mind originally 
(this is often referred to as the binding 
property).  
Definition 1:A Commitment scheme is a tuple{P, E,M }  
Where   M ={0,1}n is a  message space,   P is a set of 
individuals , generally with three elements  A  as the 
committing party,   B as the party to which 
Commitment is made and TC as the trusted party ,        
E  =  { ( ti, ei) }  are called the  events occurring at times 
ti,     i = 1,2,3  ,  as per algorithms  ei , i = 1,2,3.    The 
scheme always culminates in either acceptance   or 
rejection by A and B. 
The environment is setup initially, according to the 
algorithm Setupalg  (e1) and published to the parties A 
and B at time t1.  During the Commit phase, A uses 
algorithm Commitalg (e2), which encapsulates a 
message mאM, along with secret string SאR{0,1}k into 
a string c. The opening key (secret key) could be formed 
using both m and S. A sends the result c to B( at time 
t2). In the Open phase,   A sends the procedure for 
revealing the hidden Commitment at time t3, and B uses  
this.   
Openalg (e3): B constructs c’ using Commitalg, message 
m and opening key, and  checks weather the result is 
same as the commitment  c .   
      Decision making:     
If    ( c = c' )   
        Then A is bound to act as in m 
                             Else    he is free to  not act as m                              
 3 - Fuzzy Commitment Formally Defined: 
When would a commitment scheme as in definition 1 
become fuzzy? At the stage of decision making. This 
result of uncertainties that make crop up during 
transmission noise. We may formalize the whole 
process by properly defining it.   
Definition 2:     
 A Fuzzy Commitment scheme is a   tuple  {P, E, M, f }  
Where   Mك{0,1}k  is a  message space which consider 
as a code,   P is a set of individuals , generally with 
three elements  A  as the committing party,   B as the 
party to which Commitment is made and TC as the 
trusted party , f is error correction function (def. 5) and 
E  =  { ( ti, ei) }  are called the  events occurring at times 
ti ,  i = 1,2,3  ,  as per algorithms  ei , i = 1,2,3.    The 
scheme always culminates in either acceptance   or 
rejection by A and B. 
In the setup phase, the environment is setup initially and 
public commitment key CK generated, according to the 
algorithm Setupalg (e1) and published to the parties A 
and B at time t1.  During the Commit phase, Alice 
commits to a message mאM according to the algorithm 
Commitalg    (e2) into string c. In the Open phase,   A 
sends the procedure for revealing the hidden 
Commitment at time t3 and B use this. 
Openalg (e3): B constructs c’ using Commitalg, message 
t(m) and opening key, and  checks weather the result is 
same as the received commitment  t(c), where t is the 
transmission function.   
   Fuzzy decision making:     
If    (nearest(t(c),f(c') )≤z0) 
          Then A is bound to act as in m 
              Else    he is free to not act as m  
4-Numerical example: 
Let P =  { Alice, Bob}  i.e. we consider a situation 
where there is not trusted party. 
Message space:   Let    M ={0000, 1011, 0101, 1110, 
1010, 1100,  1111}  ⊂{0,1}4 . 
Message: let m=1011   
Encoding function:  Let g: M→{0,1}7 be one to one 
function defined as : 
 g(M)  = C ={0000000 = g(0000),  0100101 = g(1011) , 
0010011=g(0101), 0110110=g(1110), 
1011010=g(1010), 1101100 =g(1100) ,1111111 = 
g(1111)}  ⊂ {0,1}7 
The image set C under g is a code set, which is satisfies 
the closure property under XOR operation, an element 
of C is also called a codeword.      
Setup phase: At  time t1,   it is agreed between all that  
     CK  ≅  XOR    
     f    ≅   nearest neighbour in set C. 
  z0=0,20. 
Commit phase:  At time 2 
Alice committed to her massage m=1011.  She knows 
that g(m)=g(1011)=0100101 
For sake of secrecy she selects SאRC at random, 
Suppose S=1011010. 
Then her commitment c = Commitalg(CK, g(m), S) = 
g(m) XOR S= 1111111  
Alice sends c to Bob, which Bob will receive as t(c), 
where t is the transmission function. Let the transmitted 
value t(c) = 1011111, which includes noise. 
Open phase: At time t3 
Alice discloses the procedure g(m) and S to Bob to open 
the commitment. 
Suppose Bob gets t(g(m))= 1100101 and t(s)=1011010. 
Bob compute  
c’=Commitalg(CK,t(g(m)),t(s))=t(g(m))XORt(S)=0111
111. 
Bob check that dist(t(c),c’)=2, he will realize that there 
is an error occur during the transmission. 
Bob apply the error correction function f to c’: 
f(c’)=1111111 (the nearest neighbour of c’=0111111 is 
1111111). 
Then Bob will compute 
nearness(t(c),f(c’))=dist(t(c),f(c’))/n =1/7  =0.14. (def.6) 
                  Sine 0.14൑z0=0,20.  
Then FUZZ(f(c’=0111111))=0 (def.7).   
Bob accepted  t(c)=f(c’)=1111111. 
Finally Bob calculate g-1(1111111)=1011. 
 
5- Error Correcting Codes: 
Definition 3:  A metric space is a set C with a distance 
function dist:CൈC՜R+=[0,∞),  which obeys the usual 
properties (symmetric, triangle inequality, zero distance 
between equal points). 
Definition 4: Let C {0,1}n be a code set which consists 
of a set of codewords ci of length n.  The distance metric 
between any two codewords ci and cj in C is defined by 
              
dist(ci,cj)=        ci,cjאC. 
This known as Hamming distance[16] 
Definition 5: An error correction function f for a code C 
is defined as 
       f(ci)={cj│dist(ci,cj) is the minimum, over C-{ci}} 
Here cj =f(ci) is called the nearest neighbor of ci. 
Definition 6: The measurement of nearness between two 
codewords c and c’ is defined by           
                        nearness(c,c’)=dist(c,c’)/n,      
it is obvious that 0൑nearness(c,c’) ൑1. 
Definition 7: The fuzzy membership function for a 
codeword c’ to be equal to a given c is defined as  
   FUZZ(c’)= 0     if  nearness(c,c’)=z൑z0൏1 
      =z    other wise 
6- Real Life Situation :(Testament): 
Alice wants to write a testament to declare she passes all 
her fortune to her son Bob after her death. Of course, 
the Alice's attorney is playing the role of the authority. 
Setup phase: at time t1 
Attorney published to Alice and Bob 
 an envelope as a public commitment key, error    
correction function f and z0  
Commit phase: at time t2 
Alice writes her testament m and put it in a 
sealed envelope (commitment c) and gives to 
her son Bob.  During the time pass some letters 
of the testament corrupted we assume that it is 
t(c). 
Open phase: at time t3 (death time of Alice) 
Attorney on behalf of Alice meet Bob and 
reveal to him the original testament (also 
during the time may be some letters corrupted 
of the original testament i.e. t(m)), they open 
the envelope to obtain the testament m’, and 
they calculate 
• nearness(t(m),f(m’)) 
• If (FUZZ(m’)=0) 
  Then m’=m 
Else m’്m 
7- Fuzzy Commitment Schemes from 
Literature: 
Name of the 
paper 
Name of the 
author 
Year of 
publishing 
Concepts used
 
A fuzzy 
commitment 
scheme 
 
A. Juels and 
Martin W. 
 
Sixth ACM 
Conference on 
Computer and 
Communications 
Security, pages 
28-36, ACM 
Press. 1999. 
Cryptography, 
Error correcting 
codes and 
commitment 
schemes, fuzzy 
logic 
 
 
Error-
Tolerant 
password 
recovery 
 
N.Frykholm 
and A. Juels 
 
Eighth ACM 
Conference on 
Computer and 
Communications 
Security, pages 
1-8. ACM Press. 
2001 
Error correcting 
codes, 
Cryptography 
and fuzzy 
commitment 
scheme 
 
8- Concluding remarks: 
We have attempted to formalize definition of a fuzzy 
commitment scheme by introducing a fuzzy membership 
function at the opening algorithm stage. Introduction of 
error correction function was introduced by many 
research workers earlier [16,17,19]. Introduction of the 
Fuzzy member ship function makes the use of word 
fuzzy more explicit.  
References 
[1] Manuel Blum, Coin flipping by telephone. 
Advances in Cryptology: A Report on CRYPTO ’81, 
pp. 11–15, 1981, 
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mblum/research/pdf/coin/ 
[2] George J. Klir and Bo Yuan, Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy 
Logic theory and applications, Prentice Hall of 
India private limited, New Delhi 2000. 
[3] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg. A fuzzy Commitment 
Scheme. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM 
Conference on Computer and Communication 
Security, pages 28–36, November 1999. 
[4] A. Juels and M. Sudan, “A fuzzy vault scheme,” 
Proceedings of IEEE Internation Symposium on 
Information Theory, p.408, IEEE Press, Lausanne, 
Switzerland, 2002.. 
[5] Torben Pryds Pedersen, Non-Interactive and 
Information- Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret 
Sharing. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’91, 
11th Annual International Cryptology Conference, 
pp. 129–140,1991, 
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs754/2001fa/12
9.PDF. 
[6] M.Naor: Bit Commitment using pseudo-
randomness, J. of Cryptology, Volume 4, pp. 151-
158 
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/topic.ht
ml    
[7] Shai Halevi, Silvio Micali, Practical and Provably-
Secure Commitment Schemes from Collision-Free 
Hashing. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’96, 
16th Annual International Cryptology Conference, 
pp. 201–215, 1996, 
http://coblitz.codeen.org:3125/citeseer.ist.psu.edu/c
ache/papers/cs/778/ftp:zSzzSztheory.lcs.mit.eduzSz
pubzSzpeoplezSzshaihzSzcomitmnt2.pdf/halevi96p
ractical.pdf.  
[8] Shai Halevi, Efficient Commitment Schemes with 
Bounded sender and Unbounded Receiver, 
Proceedings of Crypto '95 LNCS. Vol.963 Springer-
Verlag 1995 pages 84-96. 
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/halevi96efficient.html  
[9] Hans Delfs and Helmut Knebl: Introduction to 
Cryptography principle and applications  Springer- 
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002. 
[10] William Stallings, 2001: Network Security 
Essentials applications and standards, Wesley 
Longman (Singapore) Ptd. Ltd. Indian branch. 
[11] Alfred Menezes, Paul Van Oorschot and Scott 
Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography 
CRC press 1996. 
[12] Ivan Damg°ard, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Commitment 
Schemes and Zero-Knowledge Protocols, 2006, 
http://www.daimi.au.dk/~ivan/ComZK06.pdf. 
[13] Eiichiro Fujisaki, Tatsuaki Okamoto, Statistical 
Zero Knowledge Protocols to Prove Modular 
Polynomial Relations. Advances in Cryptology - 
CRYPTO ’97, 17th Annual International 
Cryptology Conference, pp. 16–30, 1997, 
http://dsns.csie.nctu.edu.tw/research/crypto/HTML/
PDF/C97/16.PDF 
[14] Xavier Boyen. Reusable Cryptographic Fuzzy 
Extractors. In 11th ACM Conference on Computer 
and Communications Security (CCS 2004), pages 
82-91. ACM Press, 2004.. 
[15] Yevgeniy Dodis, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam Smith, 
Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from 
biometrics and other noisy data, In Proceedings of 
the International Conference on Advances in 
Cryptology (EUROCRYPT ’04), Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science. pp. 523-540,Springer Verlag, 
2004. 
[16] V.Pless, Introduction to theory of Error Correcting 
Codes Wiley, New York 1982. 
[17] G.A. Jones and J.M. Jones: Information and 
Coding Theory Springer-Verlag London Limited 
2000. 
[18] N. Frykholm and A. Juels, Error-Tolerant Password 
Recovery. In P. Samarati, ed., Eighth ACM 
Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security, pages 1-8. ACM Press. 2001. 
[19] R.J. McEliece, The Theory of Information and 
Coding. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002. 
 
